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A B S T R A C T
An increase in the number of outbreaks of Acinetobacter infection was notified in The Netherlands during
1999–2001. The present study compared the outbreaks at the species and strain levels, and analysed the
epidemiology and control measures at the different locations. For each institute, three representative
isolates from three patients were identified to the species and strain levels by genotyping methods. A
questionnaire investigated the impact of the outbreak, the control measures that were taken, and the
possible effects of the measures. Seven outbreaks were associated with Acinetobacter baumannii (three
outbreaks with a strain designated strain A, two outbreaks with a strain designated strain B, and one
outbreak each with strains designated C and D). An additional outbreak was caused by genomic species
13TU, which is related closely to A. baumannii. Strains B and D were identified as European clones III
and II, respectively. Except for two hospitals with outbreaks caused by strain A, there was no known
epidemiological link between the participating hospitals. In all hospitals the outbreak occurred on one or
several intensive care units, and spread to other departments was noted in two hospitals. The number of
patients affected ranged from six to 66 over a period of 2–22 months. In most outbreaks, patients were
the likely reservoir from which spread occurred. In all hospitals, a large panel of measures was required
to bring the outbreak to an end. Extensive environmental sampling yielded numerous positive samples
in most but not all hospitals.
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I N T R O D U C T I O N
Acinetobacter is isolated regularly from clinical
specimens in hospitals. Different species are
found under endemic circumstances, with species
belonging to the Acinetobacter calcoaceticus–Acine-
tobacter baumannii (Acb) complex constituting
more than half of the isolates [1,2]. Nosocomial
outbreaks of Acinetobacter occur frequently and
are caused almost always by A. baumannii [3]. A
common source is found in about half of all
outbreaks, and elimination of this source leads
rapidly to the end of the outbreak. When no
common source is identified and cross-contamin-
ation seems to be the driving force of the out-
break, bringing the outbreak to an end is much
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more difficult. It is likely that survival of the
microorganism in the environment, as shown by
positive environmental cultures, plays an import-
ant role in the persistence of outbreaks.
Between 1999 and 2001, eight hospitals in The
Netherlands experienced Acinetobacter outbreaks.
The simultaneous occurrence of so many out-
breaks in a relatively short period prompted an
investigation with the following questions: (i)
were some or all of the outbreaks caused by the
same strain of Acinetobacter; (ii) what was the
consequence for patients, measured as morbidity
and mortality; (iii) what control measures were
necessary to stop the outbreaks; and (iv) have
environmental cultures been helpful in under-
standing transmission and taking control meas-
ures?
M A T E R I A L S A N D M E T H O D S
Bacteriological investigations
Isolates were identified presumptively to the species level at
each participating hospital using local diagnostic procedures,
including use of API 20NE, Vitek 1 or Vitek 2 (bioMe´rieux,
‘s-Hertogenbosch, The Netherlands), or identification was
limited to the genus level. From each hospital, three repre-
sentative isolates from three patients (one from the beginning
of the outbreak, one mid-way through, and one from the end)
were sent to the Department of Infectious Diseases, Leiden
University Medical Centre, where species identification was
peformed by amplified rDNA restriction analysis (ARDRA)
and amplified fragment length polymorphism (AFLP) analy-
sis (see below). AFLP fingerprint analysis was also used to
type isolates. Antibiotic susceptibility was determined in the
Clinical Microbiology Laboratory of the Leiden University
Medical Centre.
ARDRA
ARDRA was carried out as described previously [4]. In brief,
separate aliquots of amplified 16S rDNA were digested with
five restriction endonucleases (CfoI, AluI, MboI, RsaI, MspI).
Fragments were separated by electrophoresis in agarose 2.5%
w ⁄v gels. Species identification was performed by comparing
the profiles with those of a library of strains of (genomic)
species described previously [4].
AFLP fingerprinting
Selective amplification of genomic restriction fragments
using AFLP was performed as described by Nemec et al.
[5]. Briefly, purified DNA was digested using EcoRI and
MseI, and this was followed by amplification with a Cy5-
labelled EcoRI+A primer and an MseI+C primer (A and C
are selective bases). The ALFexpress II DNA analysis system
(Amersham Biosciences, Roosendaal, The Netherlands) was
used for fragment separation. Fingerprints of fragments in
the range 50–500 bp were investigated by cluster analy-
sis with Bionumerics v.2.0 (Applied Maths, Sint-Martens-
Latem, Belgium), using the Pearson product moment coef-
ficient (r) as similarity measure and the unweighted pair-
group method with arithmetic averages (UPGMA) for
grouping. For species identification, isolates were compared
with a library of strains of all (genomic) species described
previously, using a cut-off level of 50%, above which strains
are considered to belong to the same species [5]. Isolates
were considered to belong to the same strain if they grouped
together at ‡90%.
ERIC-PCR fingerprinting
Comparative typing was based on fragments obtained by PCR
using enterobacterial repetitive intergenic consensus (ERIC)
sequences with two primers: ERIC1R, 5¢-ATGTAAGCT-
CCTGGGGATTCAC, and ERIC2, 5¢-AAGTAAGTGACTGGG-
GTGAGCG [6]. Three different PCR amplifications were
performed: one with ERIC1R, one with ERIC2, and one with
both primers. The results of the three fingerprints were
combined to generate a single type, independent of the AFLP
fingerprint analysis.
Antibiotic susceptibility testing
Antimicrobial susceptibility testing was performed with the
Vitek 2 system according to the manufacturer’s instructions.
Allocation of the results to the categories S (susceptible), I
(intermediately-susceptible) and R (resistant) was according to
the Dutch guidelines [7]. One isolate from each centre was
tested in an AST-N020 Gram-negative susceptibility card,
except for the Utrecht centre, from which three isolates were
included.
Questionnaire
A questionnaire was sent to the eight participating hospitals
at the end of 2001 to obtain the following information about
the outbreaks: number of patients involved; number of
patients who had clinical disease or died because of the
outbreak strain; times at which the first and the last patient
were detected; number and type of departments involved;
whether a common source was identified; total number and
number of positive environmental cultures, and, if environ-
mental cultures were positive, at which sites Acinetobacter was
found; total number and number of positive cultures from
medical equipment, and, if positive cultures were found, type
of medical equipment; and what control measures were
taken.
R E S U L T S
The eight outbreaks occurred in hospitals scat-
tered throughout The Netherlands (Fig. 1). The
outbreaks lasted for 2–22 months and the num-
ber of patients involved varied between six and
66 per outbreak, with a total number of 169
patients (Table 1). In all hospitals, one or more
intensive care units were affected. In two hospi-
tals, Acinetobacter had spread to general wards.
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In 27 (16%) cases, the epidemic strain of Acine-
tobacter was considered to be a definite cause of
disease. In another 26 (15%) cases, the epidemic
strain was considered to have possibly caused
disease. In two cases, death was considered to be
the direct consequence of infection with the
outbreak strain. In 13 (8%) cases, Acinetobacter
had possibly played a role in the death of the
patients.
Bacteriology
The isolates from seven of the eight hospitals
were identified as A. baumannii by comparison
of ARDRA (CfoI, AluI, MboI, RsaI, MspI profile
1 1 1 2 1) [4] and AFLP profiles with those of
the Leiden University Medical Centre reference
libraries. The exception was Utrecht, where the
outbreak was caused by Acinetobacter 13TU [8].
The AFLP typing results showed that isolates
from the same outbreak were linked by >90%
similarity, indicating that one strain was in-
volved (Fig. 2). In addition, isolates from some
hospitals clustered together at this level, indica-
ting a common type, which was corroborated by
results obtained by ERIC-PCR fingerprinting
and antibiotic susceptibility profiling (data not
shown). The outbreaks in Tilburg and Gouda
were caused by the same type (designated strain
A) of A. baumannii. Likewise, an identical type
(strain B) was found in Groningen, Leeuwarden
and Heerlen. In Leiden and Amsterdam, unique
types were found (designated strains C and D,
respectively). The A. baumannii strain B was
identified with clone III (AFLP linkage level
81%) of multiresistant strains found in Spain,
Belgium and France [9], and strain D clustered
at 81% with European clone II, which has been
found in north-west Europe and the
Czech Republic [10,11] (data not shown).
All A. baumannii strains were resistant to
penicillins, cephalosporins and quinolones.
Acinetobacter genomic species 13TU was sensi-
tive to all tested antibiotics; however, in
one patient the outbreak strain acquired
Groningen
Leeuwarden
Amsterdam
Gouda
Utrecht
Leiden
Tilburg
Heerlen
Fig. 1. Location of hospitals that experienced outbreaks of
Acinetobacter infection.
Table 1. Data concerning outbreaks of Acinetobacter infection in The Netherlands
Heerlen Groningen Leeuwarden Utrecht Tilburg Gouda Amsterdam Leiden
Number of
patients
66 14 10 23 11 6 8 31
First patient
detected
August 1999 September 2000 October 2000 October 1999 September 2000 July 2001 October 2001 November 2000
Last patient
detected
May 2001 November 2000 January 2001 May 2000 November 2000 August 2001 November 2001 October 2001
Morbidity,
possible ⁄ certain
3 ⁄ 0 5 ⁄ 6 0 ⁄ 1 11 ⁄ 6 1 ⁄ 2 1 ⁄ 2 0 ⁄ 5 5 ⁄ 5
Mortality,
possible ⁄ certain
0 ⁄ 0 3 ⁄ 1 0 ⁄ 0 0 ⁄ 0 1 ⁄ 0 1 ⁄ 0 5 ⁄ 0 3 ⁄ 1
Departments
involved
(number)
ICU (3) ICU (4)
General ward (1)
ICU (1)
Coronary care
unit (1)
General ward (3)
ICU (1) ICU (1) ICU (1) ICU (3) ICU (2)
Common source Not identified Not identified Not identified Not identified Not identified Not identified Not identified Ventilator
Bear Hugger
(likely)
Control measures A, B, C, D A, D, E, F A, C, D, G, H A, B, C, D, G, I A, B, D, G, H, J C, D A, B, C A, B, C, D, H
A, patient isolation; B, patient screening; C, intensified standard precautions; D, intensified cleaning and disinfection; E, intensified hand hygiene; F, department closure; G,
cohort nursing; H, admission stop; I, limitation of cephalosporin use; J, screening of personnel; ICU, intensive care unit.
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resistance to aminoglycosides, cephalosporins
and quinolones, as described in detail elsewhere
[8].
Epidemiological investigations and control
measures
In seven of the eight hospitals, samples were
taken from the environment, furniture, medical
and non-medical equipment, the tap water sys-
tem and the air-conditioning system. In six
hospitals, multi-site contamination with the out-
break strain was observed (Table 2). This was
not the case in Leiden, where the outbreak strain
was recovered only from the electronic compart-
ment of ventilators and filters from a Bear
Hugger, an apparatus from which cold or warm
air is passed to the patient’s mattress for cooling
or warming [12].
In seven hospitals, measures to control the
outbreak included isolation of patients, and
intensification of standard cross-infection pre-
cautions, including cleaning and disinfection of
the environment, furniture and equipment (Ta-
ble 1). In four hospitals, an admission stop or
closure of wards was necessary. Screening of
patients to detect carriers of Acinetobacter was
undertaken in five hospitals.
D I S C U S S I O N
The Acinetobacter outbreaks that occurred between
August 1999 and November 2001 in The Nether-
lands were caused by A. baumannii in seven
hospitals and by Acinetobacter genomic species
13TU in one hospital. Four A. baumannii strains
were involved. One strain was found in three
hospitals (Groningen, Leeuwarden and Heerlen),
and a second strain in two hospitals (Tilburg and
Gouda), while Leiden and Amsterdam each had a
unique strain. The occurrence of indistinguishable
strains in more than one hospital implied inter-
hospital spread. For the two hospitals sharing
AFLP type B (Groningen and Leeuwarden),
spread was explained by the transfer of a colo-
nised patient from one hospital to the other. There
was no direct link between the other hospitals,
and the implied inter-hospital spread came as a
surprise. The finding that strains B and D
belonged to EU clones III and II, respectively,
emphasises the epidemic potential of these
strains.
Several reports have documented episodes of
extensive spread of multidrug-resistant A. bau-
mannii among hospitals, including a multicentre
outbreak in the UK [13] and another in the USA
[14]. The fact that highly similar multidrug-
Pearson correlation (Opt 0.10%) [4.0%–6.0%] [6.0%–97.8%]
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Fig. 2. Dendrogram of cluster ana-
lysis of amplified fragment length
polymorphism fingerprints of 24
isolates from eight outbreaks of
Acinetobacter spp. infection in The
Netherlands, and the type reference
strain of Acinetobacter baumannii
(RUH 3023 = ATCC 19606T) and
unnamed genomic species 13TU
(RUH 2210 = ATCC 17903). The
grouping was determined using the
unweighted pair-group method
with arithmetic averages (UPGMA)
and Pearson’s product moment cor-
relation coefficient. Arrows denote
the strain and species delineation
levels (90% and 50%, respectively).
EU clones II and III [9–11] are
indicated. ERIC, enterobacterial
repetitive intergenic consensus.
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resistant A. baumannii strains (clones) occur in
hospitals of different cities and countries of
Europe, and beyond, is a matter for concern.
Early recognition and careful monitoring of these
strains should be part of a strategy to halt their
spread.
The overall impact of Acinetobacter on morbid-
ity and mortality is not known, and crude
mortalities have been approximated to fluctuate
between 17% and 52% [15]. In the present study,
Acinetobacter caused disease in about one-third of
patients, while disease was definitely attributed to
the organism in about half of these patients.
Typically, Acinetobacter is an opportunistic patho-
gen, causing disease in severely-ill patients. All
the outbreaks occurred primarily in intensive
care units. In c. 9% of the patients, Acinetobacter
could have contributed to mortality. Death was
considered to be directly caused by the organism
in two patients.
The main measures taken to stop the outbreaks
were barrier nursing of patients, intensification of
standard cross-infection precautions, including
cleaning and disinfection of patient rooms and
medical equipment, etc., stopping admissions or
temporary closure of departments, and screening
of patients for colonisation with Acinetobacter. No
common source was identified with certainty for
any of the outbreaks, with Leiden being the
possible exception. In Leiden, the outbreak strain
was found in the electronic compartments of
ventilators and a Bear Hugger. After removing
dust from the electronic compartments of the
ventilators and changing the filters of the Bear
Hugger apparatus, the outbreak came to an end,
suggesting that this apparatus was indeed the
source of the outbreak [12]. In the other hospitals,
cross-contamination was considered to be the
main mechanism sustaining the outbreak.
Contamination of the environment is described
in about half of the outbreaks for which informa-
tion is given concerning environmental sampling.
In 16 single-strain outbreaks with multi-site con-
tamination of the environment, no common
source was identified and cross-contamination
was considered to be the method of transmission
[8,16–30]. Of 11 single-strain outbreaks with
negative environmental cultures, seven were
identified as common source outbreaks; in four
the transmission route remained unknown [31–
Table 2. Surveillance culture results during outbreaks of Acinetobacter infection in The Netherlands
Heerlen Groningen Leeuwarden Utrecht Tilburg Gouda Amsterdam Leiden
Number of
cultures
(positive)
6603 (194) 275 (33) 75–90 (9) 80 (10) Not done 121 (15) 145 (3)
Environmenta Light rail
Floors in and
outside wards
Light rails
Floor
Bed curtains
Door-handle
Cup holder
Dialysis
water outlet
Dressing rooms Light rail Sedimentation
plate in
patient room
Furniturea Beds
Anti-decubitus
mattress
Pillow
Bedside
cabinet
Desk surface
Dustbin
Anti-decubitus
mattress
Beds Desk
surface
Laundry
bag holder
Chairs
Medical
equipmenta
Ventilator
Laryngoscope
CT scan
Infusion
pump
Ventilation
equipment
Wound
dressing
trolley
Ventilators
Dialysis
machines
Perfusors
Stethoscopes
Moisture
catcher of
ventilator
tubing
Expiration
part of
ventilator
Resuscitation
car
Ventilator
Bear Hugger
apparatus
Other
equipmenta
Refrigerator
Cleaning
basket
Computer
keyboard
Telephone
Computer
keyboard
Computer
keyboard
Tap water
systema
Kitchen sink Sinks Wash-stand Sink Sinks
Air-conditioning
and ventilation
systema
Ventilation
grate
Ventilation
grate
aSites from which positive samples were obtained.
CT, computed tomography.
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41]. The Dutch outbreaks fit this general pattern of
Acinetobacter outbreaks, in that multi-site environ-
mental contamination suggests cross-transmis-
sion, while negative environmental cultures
raise high suspicion of a common source.
Based on these results, it seems reasonable to
advocate identification of isolates to the species
and strain levels and sampling of the environ-
ment as the first step in the analysis of an
outbreak caused by Acinetobacter. When a single
strain is found in conjunction with negative
environmental cultures, the next step should be
to look for a common source. When multiple
strains or a contaminated environment are found,
measures should be taken to stop cross-transmis-
sion. Often, this will also involve closure of the
ward.
In the present study, the rates of positive
environmental samples varied considerably
among the participating hospitals (Table 2). The
differences may reflect true variations in environ-
mental prevalence, or may be caused by differ-
ences in sampling and cultivation procedures.
Control measures are frequently based on results
obtained by these procedures, and it is therefore
recommended to establish guidelines for environ-
mental tracing and monitoring of epidemic
strains of Acinetobacter.
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